Abstract Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure on each infection while maintaining its function. Although many detection techniques have been proposed, practical and effective metamorphic detection remains a difficult challenge. In this paper, we analyze a previously proposed eigenvector-based method for metamorphic detection. The approach considered here was inspired by a well-known facial recognition technique. We compute eigenvectors using raw byte data extracted from executables belonging to a metamorphic family. These eigenvectors are then used to compute a score for a collection of executable files that includes family viruses and representative examples of benign code. We perform extensive testing to determine the effectiveness of this classification method. Among other results, we show that this eigenvalue-based approach is effective when applied to a family of highly metamorphic code that successfully evades statistical-based detection. We also experiment computing eigenvectors on extracted opcode sequences, as opposed to raw byte sequences. Our experimental evidence indicates that the use of opcode sequences does not improve the results.
instruction reordering, garbage code insertion, register swapping, and so on. It is easily proved that well designed metamorphic malware can evade detection by standard signaturebased techniques [6, 25] .
Recently, a novel malware detection strategy based on eigenvalue analysis was proposed and tested in [20] . This eigenvalue analysis is, in turn, based on a classic facialrecognition technique [32] . In this paper, we apply eigenvalue analysis to a class of metamorphic malware that has thus far evaded detection by statistical based approaches and we compare the results to a variety of previously developed detection techniques. We also consider modifications to the technique proposed in [20] . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of metamorphic viruses and other relevant background information. Section 3 outlines the eigenvaluebased metamorphic detection technique developed in [20] . Our experimental results are given and analyzed in Sect. 4 . Finally, we give our conclusions and provide suggestions for future work in Sect. 5.
Background
In this section, we discuss background information that is relevant to the main topic of this paper. First, we briefly consider metamorphic techniques. Then we turn our attention to metamorphic malware. Finally, we discuss ROC curves, which are our primary data analysis tool for the experiments we have conducted.
Metamorphic techniques
The elementary processes of transposition, substitution, and insertion form a basis for code morphing. Metamorphic techniques are usually applied at the assembly code level, so our discussion here is focused on assembly code. Note that we just provide representative elementary examples of code morphing techniques, since these are sufficient for our purposes.
Instruction reordering:
We can divide code into blocks and shuffle the blocks, inserting jump instructions as required to maintain the original functionality. Such code shuffling is highly effective at breaking signatures [6] and might also be effective against structural analysis, such as the entropybased score developed in [24] , which is further analyzed in [5] .
Garbage code and dead code: Garbage code is "do nothing" code, that is, code that is executed, but does not affect the function of the program. For example, a NOP has no effect on code function. In contrast, dead code is code that is never executed. Both garbage code and dead code can be used to defend against signature detection, and these morphing strategies are also particularly effective defenses against statistical-based detection techniques [26] .
Instruction substitution:
As the name implies, instruction substitution consists of substituting equivalent instructions. This technique is an effective defense against both signaturebased and statistical-based detection. Substitution is widely used in metamorphic generators [20] .
Host code mutation: Some viruses morph their own code as well as the code of the host file into which they are inserted [13] . In addition to complicating the detection process, such a strategy can make virus removal and file repair extremely challenging.
Metamorphic malware
Next, we briefly discuss four metamorphic malware families that form the basis for the experimental results given in this paper. Three of these have appeared in the wild, while the fourth is an experimental generator that was produced to help analyze the strengths and weaknesses of statistical detection techniques.
G2:
The Second Generation (G2) virus generator claims to produce metamorphic code. G2 primarily uses instruction substitution [20] and has been shown to be only modestly metamorphic [35] .
MPCGEN:
Another mildly metamorphic generator is the Mass Produced Code Generation kit (MPCGEN). By some measures, MPCGEN exhibits much more similarity between virus generations than randomly selected benign code [4, 35] .
NGVCK:
The Next Generation Virus Construction Kit (NGVCK) uses code reordering, garbage code insertion and register swapping techniques to create highly metamorphic code [35] . The NGVCK engine is written in Visual Basic and generates 32-bit executable files [20] . NGVCK viruses are sufficiently metamorphic so as to evade signature detection, but they can be effectively detected using statistical techniques [19, 31, 35] .
MWOR:
The metamorphic worm known as MWOR was designed for research purposes [26] . The worm carries its own morphing engine and morphing is accomplished via garbage code insertion and instruction substitution. The level of morphing is on par with NGVCK, and hence MWOR worms are not subject to signature detection. The novel feature of MWOR is that dead code from non-virus files is inserted, and the amount of such code is a user-specified parameter. At sufficiently high padding ratios, MWOR worms become statistically indistinguishable from benign code, causing statistical-based detection strategies to fail [26] . In the experiments discussed below, we use MWOR worms with padding ratios from 0.5 to 4.0, where, for example, a padding ratio of 0.5 indicates that benign code equivalent to 50 % of the actual worm size has been inserted. The MWOR worms used in this research are available at [16].
Metamorphic detection
Metamorphic virus detection is an active area of research. Recent studies on metamorphic detection have focused on a wide variety of novel approaches.
The authors of [8] provide a survey of the state of the art in metamorphic detection as of 2006, with an emphasis on code emulation and behavior-based analysis. Emulation techniques are applicable to any type of malware, but such an approach is costly and there are many anti-emulation strategies available to the virus writer [3] . For the remainder of this paper, we focus on static detection, i.e., detection techniques that do not require execution (or emulation) of the code.
Next, we briefly outline methods for static detection of metamorphic malware. Our emphasis here is on recent developments.
Signature scanning and heuristics: Metamorphic viruses that use register swapping or simple instruction substitution methods can be detected using standard signatures with wildcards [29] . In a similar vein, a variety of heuristic techniques can be applied with some success to detect poorly designed metamorphic malware [29] .
Machine learning: In [35] , hidden Markov model (HMM) analysis [18, 27] is applied to the metamorphic detection problem. An HMM is trained on opcode sequences extracted from a collection of family viruses. Using the trained HMM, other members of the metamorphic family are scored, as well as a representative sample of benign files. In [35] it is shown that the highly metamorphic NGVCK viruses are easily detected using an HMM-based classifier. Other machine learning techniques have been applied to the malware detection problem. For example, support vector machines (SVM) are studied in [11, 36] .
n-gram analysis: In addition to the HMM analysis in [35] , an n-gram based scoring mechanism is developed and analyzed. This technique is also shown to provide an effective means of detecting the highly metamorphic NGVCK viruses.
Statistical analysis: The paper [31] considers a straightforward chi-squared statistical analysis of opcodes. It is shown that combining such an approach with the HMM technique in [35] yields slightly improved results.
Opcode graph analysis:
A technique based on opcode graphs is developed and analyzed in [19] . These opcode graphs are constructed using opcode digraph frequencies. This approach yields results comparable to the HMM analysis in [35] when applied to the challenging MWOR metamorphic worms, that is, detection is successful at low-tomoderate padding ratios.
Simple substitution distance:
Another opcode-based technique is considered in [21] . In this approach, opcode digraph statistics are obtained for a metamorphic family. Then, given a file that we want to classify, its opcodes are extracted, and a fast simple substitution cipher attack is applied, with the metamorphic family statistics playing the role of the "language" statistics. A high score indicates that the file opcodes can be transformed to yield a reasonable match to the family statistics, in which case the file is classified as a family virus. This technique has proven effective on the NGVCK viruses and, up to moderate padding ratios, the MWOR worms.
Structural entropy:
A similarity score based on structural entropy is developed in [24] . This score uses wavelet analysis to segment files based on variations in entropy levels and the resulting segmented files are compared using a Levenshtein distance. The score computation is efficient and it applies directly to binary files, i.e., no costly disassembly step is required. This technique is extensively analyzed in [5] , where it is shown to yield excellent results on MWOR worms, even at high padding ratios. This result is perhaps not too surprising, since the MWOR worms were designed to evade signature-based and statistical-based detection, not structural-based techniques. Interestingly, this score is only moderately successful against the NGVCK viruses.
ROC curves
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves can be used to assess the accuracy of a classification technique. ROC curves are used in a wide variety of fields [30] .
To construct an ROC curve, the true positive rate is plotted against the false positive rate. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a convenient measure of the accuracy of a classifier. Ideal classification occurs when there exists a threshold for which we have no false positives or false negatives. In such a case the ROC curve will have an AUC of 1.0, which is the maximum possible. In contrast, an AUC of 0.5 implies that the classifier is no better than flipping a coin. We present our experimental results in Sect. 4.1, where we rely on this AUC statistic as the primary measure of the quality of our results.
Eigenfaces and eigenviruses
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on an eigenvaluebased metamorphic detection strategy. In comparison to the detection techniques discussed in Sect. 2.3, this eigenvaluebased approach is most similar to the structural entropy score, since both are focused on file structure-as opposed to opcode statistics-and both can be used to score raw binaries. However, there is no reason to expect that similar structure is revealed by these techniques.
In this section, we first briefly discuss the mathematics of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Then we turn our attention to the "eigenfaces" facial recognition method in [32] , which forms the basis for the "eigenviruses" detection technique in [20] . The experimental results that we present in Sect. 4 are based on eigenviruses.
Eigenvalues and eigenvectors
In German, the word eigen means "proper" or "characteristic" [28] . In linear algebra, if a non-zero vector x satisfies Ax = λx where λ is a scalar, then x is called an eigenvector of A and λ is the associated eigenvalue [33] . Figure 1 illustrates a vector x and its transformation λx. For an eigenvector x, the effect of Ax is the same as scalar multiplication of x, with the magnitude given by λ. Eigenvector analysis can be used to reduce the dimensionality of data, since eigenvectors reveal significant relationships within the data. In addition, the larger the magnitude of an eigenvalue, the more significant the relationships.
Image classification
In [32] it is shown that eigenvector analysis can be used discern variations between image files as follows. First, the variation between different data points is represented by a covariance matrix. To quantify similarity between different images, we compute eigenvectors of the covariance matrix. The larger the associated eigenvalue, the more significant the Fig. 1 Eigenvector eigenvector, since a higher eigenvalue means that its corresponding eigenvector accounts for more variation within the image space.
For the technique in [32] , a set of training images is given. From these images, a set of eigenvectors is determined, and these vectors are referred to as "eigenfaces". The eigenfaces reveal significant features of a face, but do not necessarily correspond to intuitive features such as eyes, lips, nose, etc. The space spanned by the eigenfaces is referred to as the "face-space".
The images in the training set are then each projected onto this face-space. This yields a small set of weights for each facial image in the training set. Then given an unknown facial image that we want to classify, the file is projected onto this same face-space and the minimum Euclidean distance between this projection and those from the training set defines a score. The smaller the score, the better the image matches the training set [32] .
To summarize, the eigenfaces technique extracts relevant information from image files via eigenvalue analysis, which allows the data to be represented in a space of much lower dimension. Given an unknown facial image, it is represented by the same encoding process, and this encoding is compared to encodings for the known faces.
When an image is projected onto the face-space, it can be viewed as a reconstruction of the image in terms of its eigenvectors. An example of such a projection appears in Fig. 2 , where the projected image is taken from the training set. When an image not in the database is projected onto the eigenspace, the results may be radically different; an example of such a case is given in Fig. 3 . 3 Original and projected image not in training set [32] 3.3 Eigenviruses
In [20] , the eigenfaces technique is adapted to the malware detection problem. The resulting system is referred to as "eigenviruses". Next, we discuss training and scoring in the context of eigenviruses.
Training
The eigenviruses training process is as follows. [20] . Note that C is an N × N matrix, where N is the maximum number of bytes in any of the training files and hence, the matrix C may be very large. We want to compute the eigenvectors of C. Fortunately, we can determine these eigenvectors by dealing with much smaller matrices and we never need to compute C. Specifically, instead of computing the eigenvectors of C directly, we first find the eigenvectors of L = A T A. Note that L is an M × M matrix, and M will generally be much smaller than N .
Let v i be an eigenvector of L. Then by the definition of an eigenvector,
for some λ i . Multiplying both sides by A, we obtain of C are sorted in descending order according to the magnitude of their associated eigenvalues. Recall that the larger the magnitude of the eigenvalue, the more significant the eigenvector. Hence the first few vectors in u are the most informative.
5. We normalize all eigenvectors to be unit vectors, that is, we let
where λ i is the eigenvalue associated with the eigenvector u i . 6. We select the m largest normalized eigenvectors μ i , where m ≤ M. We refer to the linear space spanned by these eigenvectors as the eigenspace. Again, we can ignore eigenvectors with "small" eigenvalues since they do not contribute significantly to the eigenspace. 7. Each virus V i of the training set V is projected into the eigenspace [34] . We determine vectors of weights i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , M, as
. .
where, for vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ), the dot product is defined as
x j y j .
Let
We can view as a model that was trained using the viruses in V . Any given executable file can be scored against this model, as discussed below.
Scoring
Given an executable file X that we want to score, we first project the file onto the eigenspace defined by the eigenvectors μ 1 , μ 2 , . . . μ m as outlined above. Then we use the matrix in (3) to compute a score, as discussed below. If X is a virus of the same family as those in V , we expect the projection of X to be "close" to the eigenspace. On the other hand, if X is not a member of the family represented by V , we expect that this projection will not be as close to the eigenspace of V . The precise details of this scoring process are as follows.
1. Analogous to (5) above, we compute the weight vector for X . That is, and let ε i denote the distance between i and W . Then
3. Finally, let
The smaller the score(X ), the better the projection of X onto the eigenspace defined by the viruses in V , and hence the better X matches the structure of these viruses. In practice, a score threshold could be determined experimentally.
Example
We illustrate the training and scoring process with a small example. Suppose that we have four viruses belonging to a given metamorphic family. Further, suppose the byte values in these files are
First, we form the matrix with columns consisting of these byte values, namely, Next, the weights in
For this example, we find which is the matrix we will use for scoring. 2 Finally, we demonstrate the use of in scoring an executable file. Denote the file to be scored as X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 6 ). Analogous to (5), we determine the weights
This weight vector W is then used to compute
where d(x, y) is the Euclidean distance between the vectors x and y. As a concrete scoring example, consider
which is the same as 1 . Therefore d(W, 1 ) = 0 and hence score(V 1 ) = 0.
As another example, suppose we score the file X = (2, 3, 4, 4, 3, 2).
In this case,
and we find
which yields score(X ) = 3.96.
In the next section we discuss experiments we conducted using this eigenvector-based scoring technique. These experiments confirm and extend the results in [20] . 
Experimental results
We conducted extensive experiments using the eigenviruses score and variations on this scoring technique. We experimented with the virus families listed in Table 1 , each of which is briefly discussed in Sect. 2.2. For each experiment presented here, we used five-fold cross-validation, that is, the data was partitioned into five sets and five separate experiments were performed. In each experiment, 80 % of the data was used for training, with the remaining 20 % reserved for testing. In each of the five "folds" a different subset is reserved for testing. This approach tends to expose any biases in the data and it also increases the number of data points that we generate from each dataset. Table 2 shows the number of representative benign files used for testing. The cygwin files were used when testing the Windows malware, since these files have served as benign files in previous research [2, 5, 19, 21, 31, 35] . Note that all of the families in Table 1 are Windows executables, with the exception of MWOR. The MWOR worm is a Linux executable, so for the MWOR experiments, our benign set consists of Linux executables. Furthermore, for these benign files, we selected the same set of Linux utility files from which the MWOR dead code is extracted. Consequently, these files should provide a more difficult challenge for any detection method, as compared to randomly-selected Linux executables.
Experiments using binaries
We implemented the eigenviruses technique as described in Sect. 3.3. To validate our implementation, we tested it on G2, MPCGEN, and NGVCK viruses and obtained similar results to those in [20] . We have not included these results here; for details, see [10] . In addition, we experimented with All experiments in this section are based on raw bytes extracted from the "text" section of binary executable files [17] . Note that the text section includes all program code, but does not include program data or file header information.
We conducted a series of experiments. First, we trained and tested using MWOR files with a specific padding ratio. That is, we did one experiment for each padding ratio from 0.5 to 4.0, with increments of 0.5. Recall that the padding ratio for the MWOR worms refers to the ratio of benign code to malicious code-the higher the padding ratio, the more unlikely that statistical analysis can distinguish the worms from benign code. The results of these experiments are summarized in Table 3 . Note that we obtained ideal separation in each case. These results are impressive, since the MWOR worms defeat statistical detection techniques, such as those based on hidden Markov models [26] . Apparently, there is significant structural information that is common to the MWOR worms, in spite of their extensive morphing and statistical dissimilarity. It is interesting that a detection technique based on "structural entropy" provides similarly impressive results when applied to MWOR worms [5] .
We also trained on a combined set of MWOR worms. Specifically, we used five files of each padding ratio to form a single training set. The results for this case are shown in Table 4 . While these results are good, we do not obtain ideal separation at higher padding ratios.
Experiments using opcodes
Next, we modified the eigenviruses technique to use extracted opcodes, instead of raw byte values. While this increases the cost of scoring a file, we remove considerable "noise" in Figure 4 gives our opcode-based eigenvirus results for the G2 virus files. It is clear that we can detect all G2 virus files without any false positives or false negatives. These results are not surprising, since G2 is only mildly metamorphic and has proven easy to detect using other techniques [35] .
G2

MPCGEN
Our scoring results for the MPCGEN viruses appear in Fig. 5 .
As with G2, we obtain ideal separation and, as with G2, these results are not surprising [35] .
NGVCK
NGVCK is a highly metamorphic virus that should provide a much more significant challenge than G2 or MPCGEN. The score results appear in Fig. 6 and the corresponding ROC curve is in Fig. 7 . From these graphs, we see that there will be misclassifications at any threshold-the degree if misclassification is quantified in the AUC statistic in Table 5 .
MWOR
As in the binary case, we trained and tested our opcode-based eigenvirus technique on each distinct padding ratio, as well as using a combined set of files from all padding ratios. The ROC curves for the distinct cases appear in Fig. 8 . The AUC statistics for the distinct cases are given in Table 6 , while the combined results are tabulated in Table 7 . Note that neither of these two cases performs as well as the corresponding binary cases-see Tables 3 and 4 . It is perhaps somewhat surprising that, with respect to the eigenviruses technique, extracted opcodes are less informative than the raw binary text section.
Number of eigenvectors
Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis on the number of eigenvectors that are used for training and scoring. To test this parameter, we use the opcode-based approach discussed in the previous section. Also, for each experiment, we use the MWOR worms, with distinct training sets. Consequently, the results here should be compared to Table 6 . Table 8 includes AUC statistics for the MWOR worms when all M eigenvectors are used, the most significant 20 % are used, and when only the top 6 % are used. The corresponding ROC curves for the 20 % and 6 % cases appear in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively. These results clearly show that less is more, that is, using as few as 6 % of the eigenvectors yields better results as compared to using more eigenvectors. This is not entirely surprising, since the dominant eigenvalues carry most of the information. However, it may be somewhat surprising that so few eigenvectors are sufficient.
Conclusion
Metamorphic virus detection is a challenging problem. Recently, many different techniques have been applied to this problem [1, 2, 9, 20, 29, 35] . In this paper, we implemented and analyzed the eigenviruses technique proposed in [20] . We extended the work in [20] by showing that the approach successfully detects the highly metamorphic MWOR worms [26] . This was particularly impressive, since, at higher padding ratios, these worms have defeated all statistical-based detection strategies.
We also analyzed the effectiveness of the technique when raw byte values are replaced by extracted opcodes. We found that, somewhat surprisingly, the use of opcodes yields worse results. In another set of experiments, we found that a very small percentage of the most significant eigenvectors carry the useful information.
Further research into eigenvalue-based techniques for malware detection is warranted. For the experiments here, Euclidean distance was used for scoring. Other distance measures could be tested, such as Mahalanobis distance [31] or Levenshtein distance [14] . In addition, an analysis of the structure uncovered by eigenvalue analysis would be interesting, particularly in comparison to the structural entropy technique in [5, 24] . In a similar vein, a study of metamorphic techniques that can defeat eigenvalue-based scoring could prove enlightening.
Finally, other tools from linear algebra could yield additional useful malware detection strategies. Examples of such tools might include principle component analysis (PCA) [23] , singular value decomposition (SVD) [22] , or lattice reduction [14] .
